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Considerable evidence exists of high returns to public and pri\-ate  investment in cotnmodity 
research and development programs. This study investigates the potential returns to product 
research. development, and n~al-keting  in  a dynamic commotlity-market model. Theoretical 
hypotheses derived from the solution to this n~odcl  are testecl  in an empirical exanlple of 
Wakhington apples. Estimation  results show that, despite significant spillovers to research 
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incrcast: annual sales. 
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Economists  commonly  cite  publicly  funded 
agricultural  research and development (R&D) 
as the  primary reason  for the sustained  rela- 
tively high rate of productivity growth in U.S. 
agriculture (Fuglie et al.). As evidence of this 
success,  many  empirical  studies estimate so- 
cial  rates of return to agricultural  R&D to be 
far  higher  than  the  cost  of  capital  invested. 
However, there remain  several  issues regard- 
ing the econo~nic  impacts of R&D that attract 
considerable public and academic interest, in- 
cluding the returns to R&D under alternative 
market  structures  (Hamilton  and  Sunding; 
Huanp and Sexton; Moschini and Lapan), the 
returns to R&D in a multimarket setting (Lenl- 
ieux and Wohlgcnant). and the relative merits 
of investments  in  R&D and commodity pro- 
motion  (Fang and Goddard; Wohlgenant). 
However. tnost of these studies consider only 
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process R&D, or R&D designed to lower pro- 
duction costs. 
Alternatively,  product  R&D  is  becoming 
increasingly  important  as  seed  companies, 
growers, and retailers alike seek to differenti- 
ate, add value. and even brand many products 
that  have  previously  been  regarded  as mere 
commodities. In fact, product R&D, defined in 
general terms as efforts directed at developing 
food  products  with  new  attributes  that  con- 
sumers demand such as sweetness, improved 
texture, or storability, may  soon become the 
largest component of agricultural R&D spend- 
ing. As recently as 1992, fully 40% of the $3.4 
billion spent by pri\.ate industry on R&D went 
toward  designing  and  testing  new  products 
(Fuglie  et  al.).  Even  with  this  amount  of 
spending, relatively  little finds its way to fruit 
varieties and even less to successful endeav- 
ors. This relatively  low level  of activity may 
be due to the fact that most commodity R&D 
is conducted by  go\:ernment agencies and rel- 
atively little by  the commodity organizations 
and their members who perhaps stand to reap 
the  greatest  benefit  from jointly  developing 
and promoting  new  products.'  Conscquently, 
' Notable  exceptions to  rhis  ohse~-vation  I'uI-  coiii- understanding the role of product R&D. or the 
design and development of new and better ag- 
ricultural  products,  is  increasingly  important 
as the  search for value-adcled products inten- 
sifies amid declining returns for traditional or 
bulk  commoditie~.~ 
The limited role played by  U.S. commodity 
organizations  is  prlrticularly  surprising given 
that  similar  grower  associatio~ls  in  countries 
such as New Zealand, Australia, or South At- 
rica  actively  sponsor  product  R&D  and,  in 
fact, often hold trademarks on the results. U.S. 
commodity organizations.  on the other hand, 
tend  to  focus  on  either  purely  generic  pro- 
motion  efforts or local programs designed to 
create  a  regional  "brand"  of  a  commodity. 
Collective promotion programs, ~1s  opposed to 
privately  funded ones, are necewary beca~~se 
of  the free-rider problem-if  a procluct is dif- 
ficult  to  brand,  then  the  promotion  efforts of 
one producer will benefit all others whether or 
not they help fund the pro~notion.  Consequent- 
ly, no i~idividual  producer has an incentive to 
promote his or her product. Numerous etnpir- 
ical  studies demonstrate  the  ability  of  com- 
modity  organi~ations sanctioned  under  the 
1937 Agricultural  Marketing  Agreement Act 
or similar state organizations to overcome this 
free-rider  problem  and, in  fact. provide  posi- 
tive  returns to  their  members  (Alston  et  a].; 
Vande  Kamp and  Kaiser; and others). Given 
that the primary obstacle to private funding of 
R&D  consists  of  a  very  similar  free-rider 
problem  (Alston  and  Pnrdey;  Huffman  and 
~nodities  other than produce include the National Live- 
stock  and  Meat  Hoard,  the  Cotton  Council,  and  the 
National  Dairy  Board. 
'  This ilistinction  is tincr than this introduction sug- 
gests. While  many  new  products,  such  hybrid  rice 
and corn varieties. are technically the result ol' product 
RkD.  their  prirnary  benefit  has  hcen  in  i11c1-casing 
yields and hence reducing per bushel production costs. 
However,  product  R&U  is  narrowly  cletined  here  as 
activities that  lend  to  products with  irnl,rovcd  charac- 
teristics dernnnded by consulnel-s. such as convenience, 
taste, or nutritional characrcristics. As demonstrated in 
the eco~lomic  model  01'  this  article. the distincriotl  is 
made clear by  differentiating hetween supply-side ancl 
demand-side  K&D,  where  the  former  is  assumed  to 
include  all  process  and  cost-I-educing product  Rkll 
whilc the latter includes 2111  delnand-enha~icing  procluct 
R&D. 
Evenson; Katz)-the  ownership of intellect~ial 
property  rights over the output of  applied re- 
search-it  seems  that  commodity  organiza- 
tions  can  potentially  play  a  similar  role  in 
helping  growers  develop  and  market  new 
products. 
Recognizing  the  potential  benefits  to  this 
new role becomes even more important when 
the  possible  complementarities between com- 
modity  pro~notion  and develop~nent  within  a 
complete  marketing  program  are  considered 
(Chou  and  Shy). For  other consumer  goods, 
firms  such  us  Procter and Garnble or Gillette 
would not consider developing a new product 
without heavily promoting it. Similarly. prod- 
ucts that fail to provide attributes that consum- 
ers  value  cannot  be  niacle  financially  viable 
simply through heavy promotion and advertis- 
ing.  Clearly.  these  companies  recognize  the 
value of product development and  promotion 
as inseparable parts of an effective marketing 
strategy. As cotnrnodity organizations become 
more  sophisticated  in  their approach to mal.- 
keting, their exploitation of the benefits poten- 
tially  available  to  both  developing  and  pro- 
moting new products seems inevitable. In fact, 
many  commodity  groups  are  beginning  to 
adopt  elements  of  an  efficient  consumer  re- 
sponse  (ECR) p~-ograln,  two  components  of 
which arc efficient promotion and efficient de- 
velopment of new products. The incentives to 
take advantage of the possible synergies avail- 
able  become  even  more  apparent  as  plant 
breeders'  rights  are  strengthened.  By  devel- 
oping a new variety and obtaining a patent on 
it,  a commodity  organization may  be able to 
crect an effective barrier to entry, ~~LIS  vastly 
improving the I-eturn to their commodity pro- 
motion  efforts. Despite these  potential  bene- 
fits,  there  has  been  little  concerted  effort 
among  growers  to develop.  trademark,  and 
promote their own products. 
There are many potentially valid economic 
reasons  why  this  is  so. First,  R&D is an  in- 
herently  risky  endeavo~;  involving  long  lags 
betweun  investrnent and return, low probahil- 
ities of successful  innovation. and high  prob- 
ability  of  imitation.  Second, grower  organi- 
zations  are  well  aware  of  the  federal 
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search dating back to the  1862 Morrill Act, so 
they  are reluctant  to displace existing federal 
research  activities.  Third,  and  perhaps  most 
important, growers' own realizations that mar- 
keting  involves  rnore  than  just  generic  pro- 
motion  is  a  relatively  recent  phenomenon. 
Much of this realization owes itself to a long 
history of  extension  and education efforts by 
universities.  agribusiness supply  and  market- 
ing tirms, and commodity groups themselves. 
Consecl~~ently,  the critical research question is 
whether a coordinated program  in product re- 
search, development. and  pro~notion  may  in- 
deed  be  economically  beneficial  to  a private 
organization. 
Thus. the  objective of thi\  study  is to de- 
termlne  whether  there  exists  empirical  evi- 
dence of complementarities between commod- 
ity  research  and  promotion  expenditures.  To 
achieve these objectives, the study develops a 
simple  economic  model  of  a  representative 
firm engaged in  both  research and promotion. 
We  use this model  to demonstrate how  these 
two activities interact  and how  the incentives 
to engage in one depend on  the effectiveness 
of  the  other. From this theoretical  model, we 
develop  a  simultaneous,  dynamic  empirical 
model  of  promotion,  R&D,  and  patent  pro- 
ductivity. Using historical data describing U.S. 
apple sales. promotion  activity.  and  new  va- 
riety development, we test the  implications of 
our theoretical model. We  u\e the results from 
thi5  empirical  exercise  to  draw  implication\ 
for activities of  both  apple grower  organiza- 
tions and commodity groups more generally. 
An  Economic Model  of Product 
Development  and Promotion 
Typically, studies that compare the incentives 
to  invest  in  cost-reduction  or  process  R&D 
and commodity promotion  treat the former as 
a  supply  shifter  and  the  latter  as a  demand 
shiftcr  (Fang and  Goddnrd; Levin  and Reiss; 
Wohlgenant).  Letnieux  and  Wohlgenant  and 
Voon  and  Edwards.  how eve^; consider exam- 
ples  of  product  R&D  where  agricultural  re- 
search is assumed to shift domestic and export 
demand, respectively,  without  the aid  of  pro- 
motion.  Si~nilarly,  Wohlgenant  assumes  that 
the economic effects of product R&D and pro- 
motion  are observationally  equivalent. How- 
ever, differentiating between these two activi- 
ties  is  critical  because,  as  we  argue  above, 
researchers  direct  a  significant  part  of  total 
R&D spending toward product,  and  not  pro- 
cess, innovation. Further, it  is an  oversimpli- 
fication to assume that because they both serve 
to change demand that their effects are indis- 
tinguishable. Rather, we assume both activities 
affect commodity demand but that their influ- 
ences differ  in  strength,  persistence,  and ap- 
propriability-three  key factors in determining 
the  returns to investment in  each. By  consid- 
ering each as a separate activity, we model not 
only their unique impact on demand but  also 
the  possibility  of  synergistic  effects  among 
them. 'The  objective of  this  section is, there- 
fore, to develop a theoretical  model of firms' 
investment  in  advertising  and  product  R&D 
that accounts for these differences. 
This  study  follows  Nerlove  and  Arrow; 
Jacquemin; and Vidale and Wolfe in construct- 
ing an optimal dynamic model of investments 
in  promotion and R&D but extends this work 
by  allowing for varietal patenting, spillover in 
both  research  and promotion, and  interaction 
between  them.  Detertilining  optimal  invest- 
ments in  advertising and  promotion  is an  in- 
herently  dynamic problem  due to the  inipor- 
tance  of  trial,  experience,  and  learning 
(Kotowitz and  Mathewson) or the  formation 
of "goodwill"  (Nerlove and An-ow). Howev- 
er, the creation of goodwill requires more than 
words  and images,  but  also requires a repu- 
tation for quality, value, and effectiveness that 
comes only  from  investments  in  product  de- 
sign. Research  and promotion. therefore, both 
contribute to the creation and maintenance of 
goodwill but in  different ways and at different 
rates. Whereas advertising often produces only 
short-term  gains  in  market  share,  improved 
product  attributes often  take months or years 
to become established, particularly  in  the case 
of  new  plant  varieties, but  can  result in  sus- 
tained  increases  in  demand.  The  theoretical 
model described below incorporates these dif- 
ferences in  a simple, dynamic demand frame- 
work. 
This model  also extends the exihting liter- ature  by  explicitly  considering  spillovers  to 
both activities. Producers of agricultural com- 
modities often face both rivalry and duplicity 
with respect to their advertising activities and 
imitation  in  their efforts to create new  varie- 
ties.  Similar to  Levin  and  Reiss, Carey  and 
Bolton, and Jacquemin, we include these spill- 
overs in the model as simple "conjectural var- 
iations"  or, to avoid the confusion surrounding 
this term (Geroski), simply aggregate response 
parameters, cp.?  In  the case of advertising, this 
assumption  allows  the  model  to  include  all 
types of advertising as special cases, from pure 
brand advertising (9  = dA,li)tr,, > I ) to generic 
(cp  = dA,li)cl,, < 1). In  the extreme. the generic 
case can even lead to a reduction in the stock 
of industry advertising if  free-riding  7  1s  '  severe. 
By  including  such aggregate response parame- 
ters for both  advertising  (9) and  R&D  (O),  the 
model captures the effect of varying degrees of 
appropriability  of both  advertising and research 
on  the optimal  dernand  for each. Similarly. the 
process governing goodwill accumulation incor- 
porates  other  ways  in  which  advertising  and 
R&D difler4ifferences that are only apparent 
in  a dynamic marketing model. 
Although there are many  alternative spec- 
ifications for goodwill dynamics that are coni- 
rnon  in  the  literature (see Sethi foi- a review), 
Nerlove  and  Arrow  assume that  the stock of 
goodwill  grows with  new  investment but  de- 
cays by  a constant proportion each period. Re- 
flecting likely differences in the persistence of 
where  B,,  A, are the rates of  growth of  each 
stock and 6,  is the constant rate of depreciation 
of stock k.  Chintagunta and Jain use a similar 
specification for the evolution  of  goodwill  at 
two levels of a marketing channel but capture 
their  interaction  through  a  single-period  de- 
mand  function. In  the present case, however, 
the interaction is not  between  pro~notion  and 
spending on  R&D but rather between promo- 
tion  and the output of an R&D process-new 
product innovations. To capture this effect, we 
assume  that  R&D  generates  innovations  ac- 
cording to a patent productivity function. Be- 
cause  patents  are  discrete  random  variables, 
we assume they  are generated according to a 
Poisson process  (Cincera; Griliches; Hall, 
Griliches, and Hausman: Hausman, Hall, and 
Griliches;  Lan-jouw,  Pakes.  and  Putnam; 
Wang, Cockburn, and Puterman), so the prob- 
ability of  observing N,,  innovations for con- 
modity  i  in  period  t is 
which  implies  that  the  expected  number  of 
patents each time period  is 
Studie\ that  focu\ on estimating a patent  pro- 
duction  function  4milar to ecluation (3) typi-  ~. 
each  activity's  impact on  demand, this study  cally  include such  factors as R&D spending. 
differentiates between  the decay  paths  of  the  interindustry  R&D spillovers (Cinccra), indi- 
stock of  K&D and advertising by defining two  cators of  market  structure (Gopinath and  Va- 
state variables. or types of goodwill. each with  savada), or a simple time trend  in  the vector 
its own rate of depreciation:  of determinants,  XI. Because the ob.jective of 
this  article  is  more  limited  than  this  and  be- 
cause each of these other factors is not  likely 
to be important for an agricultural commodity, 
X,  includes  only  annual  public  spending  on 
R&D for the commodity in  cluestion, B.  Con- 
'  Although thi\ as\urnption is necessary to focu\ on  scquently,  demand  depends  not  on  R&D 
the  oh-jectives of  thc  modcl,  d'A\pcrrnont  and  Jac- 
uuernin  demonstrate  that  val-ious assu~nptions  about  but  the number  Of  new 
R&D and output rivalry can lcad to markedly different  products. 
results.  In  the  current  context.  "ipillovers"  refer  to  we model  delnand as  a  func- 
competitive  response\  from  out\ide  the  dorne\tic  in-  tion of both promotion and new product intro- 
dustry.  e.g.. responses  from New  Zealand  applc mar- 
keter\ ,(]  generic  DrOrnotion  DrOolnms (,,.  new varieties  ductions in  a  manner  similar  to  Chintagulita 
L  .  - 
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ing  nonprice  methods, so prices are assumed 
to be parametric to their decision. To  simplify 
the notation, define N as its expected value and 
suppress  the  time  and  individual  firm  sub- 
scripts, so the direct demand curve is 
which,  as opposed to a linear demand  speci- 
fication,  allows  demand  to  be  concave  in  A 
and N and is  a second-order approximation to 
any arbitrary demand function. Notice that this 
function models the possible complementarity 
between A atid B in  a very simple way as the 
marginal productivity  of one is a linear func- 
tion of the other. Further, assuming advertising 
and R&D costs are convex and separable. cost 
functions for each are 
where y,, is the unit price of activity k. Com- 
bining  each  of  these  elements of  the  model, 
the objective function (Hamiltonian) becomes 
(6)  H(A,,  B,, (I,I'W 
= p,q,(A,,  N,) - C,, - C,{, + h,~,  + TI#,. 
where e-"A,  c  "q are the marginal present val- 
ues  of  an  increment  to  the  stock  of  product 
knowledge and  product  quality, respective1  y. 
Assuming  firms choose current  levels  of  in- 
vestment in  advertising (rr,) and R&D (h,)  and 
regard prices as given, we derive the solution 
to equation (6) using standard methods of op- 
timal control  (see Appendix A). More impor- 
tant, this  solution  provides  structural demand 
equations for  both  advertising and R&D ex- 
penditures. 
where q,  = i)~jli)A  = aO  + 2ajA  + a,N,  y,  = 
ilqldN = a? -1 ZaiN + a4A,  N, = dNIdB = P,,w, 
and the  second derivatives follow straightfor- 
wardly.  Although  not  in  reduced  form, these 
structural equations define the  basic  rules for 
current expenditure on  advertising and R&D. 
conditional  on  changes  in  the  stock  of  each 
over  time.  Specifically,  equation  (7) implies 
that optimal annual advertising investment de- 
pends on the current  marginal  value  product 
of advertising, net of its price, plus the present 
value of all future advertising investments net 
of  any  spillovers  (negative  or  positive) that 
may  exist  between  advertising  and  R&D. 
Equation  (8) has  a  similar interpretation  for 
investments  in  R&D, but  here  the  marginal 
value product of both current and future K&D 
spending depends critically  on the productiv- 
ity  of  R&D. Differentiating  these  equations 
with  respect  to  structural  parameters and the 
stocks of advertising ancl  R&D permits us to 
derive hypotheses with regard to the likely ef- 
fect  of  persistence, appropriability.  and  corn- 
plementarity  between  advertising  and  new 
product development.-' 
In  a dynamic model, there are many plau- 
sible detinitions of  complementarity. For the 
purposes of this article, we define net dynamic 
complementarity  as  the  case  where  the  de- 
mand  for a  particular  investment rises in  the 
stock of the other. Consequently, the degree of 
cotnplementarity  between  advertising and 
R&D is found by, first, differentiating the de- 
mand for advertising with respect to the stock 
of R&D. 
Assuming  the  marginal impact  on  firm  sales 
of  introducing  new  products  rises  in  the 
amount of  advertising that  accompanies their 
Given the complexity of' the full reduced-form so- 
lutions for n and h, numerical simulations of each com- 
parative  static  are  required.  These are  interpreted  in 
Appendix  A.  Thc conclusions  there.  however,  differ 
little from the qualitative conclu5ions l'ound  using the 
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introduction (a,  > 0) and the patent produc-  R&D by an individual firm spillover to the rest 
tivity  function  is  concave (0 < p, <  I), the  of  the industry  are likely  to differ from each 
demand  for  advertising  rises  in  the  stock  of  other.  While  the  appropriability  of  benefits 
R&D only if  from advertising depend on whether it is per- 
ceived as generic or brand-specific, R&D ac- 
( 10)  ~,d  - N,,6,  > 0  tivities that  involve basic  science rather than 
or  if  the  net  rate  of  productivity  growth  of 
R&D investments exceeds the  rate  at  which 
previous  increases in  R&D efficiency become 
obsolete. These assumptions also ensure that 
the complementarity between u and 8  rises in 
the value of  cp  or the extent of rivalry among 
'tven  advertisers. In  other words, the more a g' 
message is seen as generic, thereby promoting 
all products in the category, the less incentive 
an  individual  firm  has to develop and market 
new products within that category. 
A  similar  exercise  determines  whether  a 
similar complementarity  applies in  the oppo- 
site direction-from  advertising to R&D. Dif- 
ferentiating  the  demand  for  current  R&D 
spending by  the stock of advertising goodwill 
gives 
which  implies  that  the  rate  of  investing  in 
R&D rises in the stock of advertising goodwill 
only if 
( 12)  (N, - ~~$0)  + 86, > 0. 
A  \ufticie~it  condition  for  equation  (12)  to 
hold  requires either the productivity of  R&D 
in  creating new  patents (p, = N,)  or the  ap- 
propriability  of  R&D  investment  to  be  low 
patentable  products  are  more  likely  to  spill- 
over. To show this,  we  first  differentiate the 
demand for R&D in  the parameter  0  and find 
Recall that higher values of fl mean that a giv- 
en  firm's  R&D  investment  has  a  relatively 
large  impact  on  the  total  stock  of  R&D  or 
product  development  knowledge.  Therefore, 
equation (13) implies that. if the current mar- 
ginal value product of  adding to the stock of 
R&D is greater  than  the  discounted  value of 
an  increment to the  stock of  R&D in  the fu- 
ture, then a higher value oft)  will induce high- 
er levels of  individual  tirm  investment.  As a 
corollary, the  more  investment  by  one firm 
displaces  investment  by  others  (0 <  1). the 
less incentive a firm has to invest in R&D on 
its own. Clearly, a firm need invcst less today 
to achieve a given level of sales the more other 
members of  the industry invest in  knowledge 
that it can use as well. However, we are unable 
to  determine  rr  l7t.io1-i whether  this  is  indeed 
the case, so the sign of this effect remains an 
empirical question. A similar exercise defines 
equivalent conditions for the impact of adver- 
tising spillover on the demand for advertising. 
Differentiating the demand for advertising  in 
the aggregate response parameter gives 
enough, so that (P,O)-' > B. These condition\  tltr 
imply that a firm will only concluct more R&D  (14) -  = pq, - (r + fi,)'[py,,A  f /)y,,N,,BI. 
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as  its  stock  of  advertising  goodwill  rises  if 
they are unable to create new products or I-e- 
tain  their benefits  at a  rate  sufficient  to take 
advantage of their greater ability to advertise. 
Although  this  is  an  indirect effect of  appro- 
priahility, it also has a direct effect that reflects 
one  of  the  fundamentally  different  ways  in 
which advertising and  R&D impact demand. 
First,  the  extent  to  which  advertising  and 
which  is directly analogous to equation  (1  3). 
Specifically, if  the present value of increasing 
current advertising and R&D stocks is greater 
than  the discounted  marginal  value of  higher 
futu~-e  sales, then  "brand"  advertising, or ad- 
vertising with a higher value of  (F,  will induce 
niore individual investment in  advertising. Be- 
cause higher  values of  cp  imply  a  strong ag- gregate  response  to  investments  made  by  a 
single  firm, then  ceteris ptrrihu.~,  a  rising  cp 
will lead to more advertising by 311 individual 
firm.  On  the  other hand, lower  values  of  cp. 
which  are consistent with  aggl-egate free-rid- 
ing  behavior, will  lead  to lower levels  of  in- 
dividual  investment.  Such  is  the  case  with 
"generic"  commodity promotion. 
Unlike  advertising  spillover, which  is  not 
subject to direct control, the amount of R&D 
spillovel- can  be  controlled by  establishing a 
patent.'  If n tirm is able to patent a new variety 
that is clearly superior to existing strains, then 
others must conduct their own research, often 
resulting  in  a  process  01'  "patenting  around" 
the  initial  innovation  (Choi). In  this  frame- 
work, patents cause 8  to take  a binary  rather 
than  continuous value-a  firm  either owns a 
patent or does not. Levin  and Reiss consider 
a logical outcome of such an R&D game with 
appropriability as one that maintains "constant 
market  shares,"  where 8  = n as each firm in- 
vests just  enough  in  R&D to  maintain  their 
current  position.  The result  in  equation  (1  3) 
suggests  that  the  lack  of  a  spillover  effect 
causes  a  firm  to  invest  more  in  R&D, thus 
increasing the incentive to advertise. However, 
this  is  not  necessarily  the  case  in  a dynamic 
framework. Specifically, cotiiparing  "patent" 
and  "no patent"  versions of equation (8), it is 
evident that the net effect once again depends 
on the growth rate of each stock relative to its 
annuali~ed  opportunity  cost  and  the  strength 
of the marginal product (a, and a,) and inter- 
action parameters (a,): 
where b, is the investment in  R&D with pat- 
enting  and  h,,  is  investment  without  patent 
laws. Investment will rise, therefore. if the cur- 
rent  aggregate value  of  new  products  created 
is greater than the capitalized value of the in- 
vestment  in  R&D and advertising required to 
bring  them  about.  Resolution  of  the sign of' 
these comparative static derivatives, however, 
requires knowledge of the parameters of  both 
the commodity demand function and the equa- 
tions of motion governing the growth of both 
advertising and  R&D stocks. 
Econometric Model of  Promotion 
and R&D 
Our econometric  model  consists of  both  the 
structul-a1 equations for new product develop- 
ment and aggregate demand (equations (3)  and 
(4)) as well  as the  first-order  conditions  for 
optimal expenditure on  advertising and R&D 
(ecl~~ations  (7) and  (8)). Specification  of  the 
fill1 model is necessary both to recover the ag- 
gregate response parameters and to ensure that 
the  estimated  parameters  are consistent  with 
the theory outlined above. To make the econo- 
metric model tractable, we convert the contin- 
uous  structural  equations  above  into discrete 
form  and  follow a two-stage estimation pro- 
cedure. Assuming  patents  occur according to 
a Poisson  process.  in  the  first stage, we esti- 
mate  a  single-equation  Poisson  model  using 
maximum likelihood  methods 
where  N,  is  the number of patents granted  in 
year  t  and  R, is  the  amount  of  public  R&D 
expenditure  on  deciduous  tree  fruits  in  the 
U.S. in year t. Empirical Poisson models, how- 
ever,  often  find  evidence  of  overdispersion 
(variance greater than the mean), which leads 
to inconsistent estimates of  p, above. Gener- 
alizations of  equation (16) take  this  into  ac- 
count,  wherein  the  Poisson  parameter  varies 
according to a random  disturbance term, 
'  Of  course, where existing patent  laws ace  insul- 
ficient  to protect  intellectual property  riglit\  in  plant  (17)  In  N,  = p,,  + P,R, + P.,, 
development, the policy  scenario become\  one of  es- 
tablishing patent  law\  by  a  government rather than a 
firm establishing a patent.  where  the  distribution  of  p,  determines  the rric.~lltl*r(~l  (111d Applied  Econonlic.~,  Dacernher  2002 
specific form of the alternative model. Specif- 
ically,  if  g(p,) isgamma distributed, then  N, 
follows a negative  binomial  distribution with 
density 
where  qr,  is the mean of the process,  v,  is the 
precision  parameter, and r is the gamma den- 
sity function (Cameron and Trivedi). Cameron 
and Trivedi develop a simple I-egression-based 
test for overdispersion that is useful  in  select- 
ing  between  a Poisson  and  the  more general 
negative binomial  models. Under the null hy- 
pothesis of  no ovcrdispersion, the variance of 
N, is equal to its mean, but under the alterna- 
tive,  the  variance  is  some  function  of  the 
mean, 
where they  assume simple linear or quadratic 
functional forms for /?(I),).  With either of these 
assumptions,  testing  for  overdispersion  then 
involves running linear regressions of the var- 
iance of N, on each /7($,)  and conducting t-tests 
for the  significance of  y.  If  this  parameter  is 
signiticantly  different  from zero, we reject the 
Poisson  specification  in favor of the negative 
binomial. The second-stage model consists of 
equations (3),  (7),  and (8), which we estimate 
simultaneously  to account  for the  likely  en- 
dogeneity  of  advertising  stocks  and  patent 
counts. Writing equation (7) in estimable form 
gives an expression for investments in  adver- 
tising. 
(20)  ti, = cu,,(k, + cp)  + 2n,(k1  + q)A, 
while ecluation (8) gives the estimated form of 
the R&D or new  procluct development equa- 
tion. 
where k, = (r  + ti,,)-'  and k, = (r  + 6,)  '  and 
we allow for a full val-iancelcovariance  matrix 
among  equation  residuals.  Nonlinear  three- 
stage  least  squares  provides  consistent  esti- 
mates of  all  structural parameters  in  the  sys- 
tem, given prior estimates of p, and estimates 
of 6, and 6, found  using the grid-search pro- 
cedure defined  below. The remaining  param- 
eters, of  which there are only seven, are easily 
identified given the parsimony of this system. 
This is an important characteristic of this mod- 
el  because  the  data  on  R&D  investments  is 
notoriously  scarce. 
Data and Methods 
In  order to both  test the hypotheses described 
above and provide parameter estimates for the 
indeterminate  co~nparative  static  results,  we 
apply  our modeling  framework to  data from 
the  Washington  apple  industry  and  publicly 
funded  R&D programs. Specifically, the data 
consist of annual advertising funded by Wash- 
ington apple growers through the Washington 
Apple Comlnission (WAC),  R&D investments 
by  the  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture 
(USDA), and  patent  awards  to  both  private 
breeders and USDA scientists (U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office) for the period  1973-1 998. 
Although the WAC is I-esponsible  for a dom- 
inant share of  media advertising  of  apples in 
the United States, the development of new va- 
rieties  may  be  attributable  to  a large number 
of  sources. Private seed companies and  nurs- 
eries,  private-public  consortia,  universities, 
and individual growers have all been  respon- 
sible  fol- the  development  of  new  varieties 
over  the  sample  period.  However,  none  of 
these entities provides data on R&D spending 
specifically  on apples, so expenditures by  the 
USDA are used  as an indicator or the indus- try's  efforts  to  develop  new  varieties.  Al- 
though  these  sources provide  data on  annual 
gross investments in R&D and advertising, the 
Nerlove-Arrow  goodwill  model  requires  the 
definition of a "stock"  of R&D and advertis- 
ing. 
Because patents in  this area expire after 20 
years,  it  seems  natural  to  assume  a discrete 
depreciation schedule of  100% after 20 years. 
However. the state v:rriable  is not the number 
of  patents but  the stock of  R&D investments 
that are used  to generate new  patents. By  as- 
suming the knowledge generated by  these in- 
vestments deteriorates at a constant linear rate, 
we presume a continuous rate of obsolescence. 
With respect to the stock of advertising good- 
will,  other studies (Cox; Rickertsen) develop 
lag structures that capture the fact that adver- 
tising  does not  have  its  greatest  impact  until 
several weeks into the campaign. but  then the 
effects decline geometrically over time as the 
message is forgotten by  consumers. However. 
in  annual  data,  these  intraperiod  effects  are 
likely to be lost. Therefore, we assume good- 
will  accumulates  according  to  equation  (1) 
above. Slade and  Ehrlich  and  Fisher discuss 
the  problems  associated  with  estimating  de- 
preciation  rates for both state variables in  the 
Nerlove-Arrow  frameu~ork.  In this  study, we 
follow  Ehrlich  and  Fisher  by  estimating  the 
entire model  over a range of assumed depre- 
ciation rates ancl choosing the pair (S,,, 6,,) that 
maximizes  the  log-likelihoocl  function  of  the 
entire model.  In  this  way,  the  rate  at  which 
advertising depreciates  is  not  independent  of 
the decay in  product development  knowledge 
and vice versa. 
Although it would be preferable to estimate 
the  patent  productivity  and  investment  de- 
mand  models together, there is  no known es- 
timator for a  nested  coi111t data and nonlinear 
three-stage  least  squares problem, so we  use 
the two-stage procedure described above. With 
this approach. we estimate the patent-genera- 
tion process in the first stage. Because patents 
arrive in  :r  discrete manner and  as a function 
of  R&D investments, we estimate patent pro- 
duction as a count-data regression as in  Haus- 
man, Hall, and Griliches; Cincera; Crepon and 
Dugr~et:  or Cameron and Trivedi. These stud- 
ies provide thorough discussions of the Inany 
issues  involved  in  applying  this  approach  to 
estimating  patent-productivity  models  so will 
not be repeated here. Assuming the arrival pa- 
rameter is gamma distributed implies a nega- 
tive  binomial  model, although we test against 
a  Poisson  alternative.  In  general,  empirical 
studies of patent generation tend to find a pos- 
itive, if  not always uniformly btrong. relation- 
ship between  R&D and the number of patents 
granted  (Wang,  Cockburn,  and  Puterman). 
Therefore, we adopt  a  similar  approach  and 
include R&D as an explanatory variable in the 
arrival  rate function. 
In  the  second  stage.  we  estimate  the  de- 
mand for outpi~t  (equation (4)),  along with the 
investment demand  for advertising  (equation 
(7)) and R&D (equation (8))  in a simultaneous 
equations procedure. Specifically. we use non- 
linear  3SLS  in order to  account  for  simulta- 
neity  in  the  change  in  advertising  and  R&D 
stochs as well as to impose the cross-eqnations 
restrictions  implied  by  the  theoretical  model 
and  the prior estimates of  p,. the  patent  pro- 
ductivity  parameter.  The instruments  for this 
procedure  consi\t of  all  exogenou\  and  pre- 
determined variables  in the model. Of course, 
we first convert all time derivatives to discrete 
first  differences  to  facilitate estimation. Once 
we obtain these parameter estimates, we then 
conduct  numerical  birnulations  to  determine 
the signs of the comparative static effects that 
are (1  171-iot-i  indeterminate. 
Results and Discussion 
Table  1  provides  the  results  from estimating 
both  stages of the R&D and advertising mod- 
el. In  the tirst  stage, we first conduct speciti- 
cation  tests  of  the  maintained  Poisson  model 
relative  to  a  negative  binomial  alternative 
(Cameron and  Trivedi; Cinccra). The estima- 
tion results provide t-ratios of 2.488 and 2.144 
for  the  lineal- and  quadratic  /I($)  terms.  re- 
spectively.  Therefore,  we  reject  the  Poisson 
model  in  favor of  a negative  binomial  speci- 
fication. This tnisspecification test  says noth- 
ing, however, about the goodness of  fit of the 
negative  binomial  alternative.  One  common 
mcasure of goodness of  fit involves comparing 410  Journal qf'Agricultuml arltl Appl~ed  Econo?izics. I)clc.ember  200-3 
Table  1.  Patent Productivity  and Dernand for Advertising  and R&D: Washington  Apples 
Coefficient  Variable  Estimate  t-ratio  Elasticity  t-ratio 
Stage 1:  patent productiv~ty  negative binomial e\timatesl 
Constant  ,425  0.712  -  - 
B  ,768  2.435  ,209  2.635 
,s(N,)  .I14  0.7 
-  - 
Stage 2: demand for advertising and R&D-3SLS  estimates' 
(10  A  ,046  2.97  1  .24X  1.367 
I  A'  -  .002 
-  -2.58  1 
- 
a2  N  .0 16  1.965  ,035  1.808 
a  3  N'  ,006  -2.73 
-  - 
%  AN  ,004  1.941  .024  1.041 
0  ~lB/db  .34  1  0.887  -  - 
d,  dAMo  ,595  3.3  17  -  - 
--  --  -  -  - 
I The likelihood  ratio tcst statistic comparing the estirnatecl against a null model is  15.16h with  1  df. Thc critical chi- 
square value at a 5% Ievcl of  significance  i\ 3.84. 
"The  pseudo-R'  vnluos for each cquntion are as follows:  advertising  demand. ,649: R&D demand. ,766; applc sales. 
.hX3. 
the  estimated  model  to  a null  model  using  a 
likelihood  ratio tcst. With  a chi-square value 
of  15.166, compared with  a critical  value of 
3.84, we are confident that this model does an 
acceptable job  of  explaining  patent  variation 
over time. Importantly, however.  the interprc- 
tation  of  Dl remains consistent with  the  sim- 
pler Poisson  model. Fro111 the results reported 
in Table  1, the estimate of  B, implies an elas- 
ticity of .2  1. so that we expect a 10% increase 
in funding to generate a 2%' increase in patent 
formation. It  remains, however, to  determine 
whether  patent  activity  causes an  increase in 
sales v~lume.~ 
Table  1  also provides estimates of the si- 
multaneous demand model. Given that the ma- 
jority  of  the  parameters  are significantly  dif- 
ferent from zel-o and are of the expected sign. 
we are confident that the   nod el provides a rea- 
sonable fit  to the data. However, because the 
coefficient of determination is not well defined 
in  a  nonlinear  3SLS  model,  we  calculate  a 
- 
" Note that this model is \imilar to Chintagunta and 
Jain in assuming short-run industry equilibrium, so that 
grower welfare is determined by  sales quantity. In the 
long run, both  price and quantity  cl'fects  would  have 
to result  in  ordcr for thel-c to be a steady-statc rise in 
producer surplus (Kinnucan). A model of  long-run in- 
dustry equilibrium  is,  however,  beyond  the scope of 
this research but is easily derived fro111 the steady-state 
solution to the dynamic model presented herein. 
pseudo-R2, or the coefficient of determination 
between  observed  and  predicted  dependent 
variable values, as further evidence. As shown 
in  Table  I, the pseudo-R2 is .649 for the ad- 
vertising demand equation, ,766 for the  R&D 
equation,  and  ,683 for  the  output  equation. 
With  the  paucity  of  data  available  for  this 
analysis, these values suggest a relatively good 
tit  to the data. so we interpret each with some 
confidence. 
According to our simple model of demand, 
higher sales result from either creating a per- 
ception of higher cl~~ality  through  advertising 
or from generating  new  and  improved  prod- 
ucts. Implicitly, therefore, we assume new ap- 
ple varieties embody traits that consumers pre- 
fer  over  their  existing  choices.  The  second 
panel of Table  1  supports this assumption. Ge- 
neric apple advertising causes sales to increase 
with a partial elasticity of .248 at the mean of 
satnple advertising and sales but at a declining 
rate  as  advertising  increases.  This  result  is 
consistent  with  previous  studies'  assessment 
of  the  effect of  generic advertising on apple 
demand (Richards and Patterson; Ward). The 
development  of  new  varieties,  on  the  other 
hand. also causes sales to increase at a declin- 
ing  rate.  Again  at  the  mean  of  the  data, the 
partial  elasticity  of  sales with  respect to new 
variety generation is ,035. Further, we expect Richards  clnrl  Patlilltr:  Cornmoditv R&L) and Proinotion  41  1 
that  commodity  promotion  and  new  variety 
creation  exhibit synergistic, or complementa- 
ry, effects. Although  positive complementari- 
ties are statistically  significant only in a one- 
sided  hypothesis  test,  the  implied  partial 
elasticity of .024 suggests that the creation and 
promotion  of  new  varieties  can  indeed  in- 
crease total  apple sales more efTectively than 
either activity conducted in  isolation. Each of 
these  elasticities.  however,  measures  the  re- 
sponse of  sales  to stock  variables  but  not  to 
annual investments in  advertising and R&D. 
Response  elasticities  for  annual  invest- 
ments  differ  from  their  cun~ulative  counter- 
parts primarily due to the more volatile nature 
of annual investments and the bpillover effects 
of each. In the case of  R&D investments, the 
point estimate of 0 in Table  1  suggests that the 
stock of aggregate "new  product knowledge" 
increases  by  34%  of  every  new  dollar. This 
implies that, while R&D is not a perfect public 
good, there is a significant amount of leakage. 
As a result. the short-run elasticity of individ- 
ual  investments in  R&D  is only  ,001 (t-ratio 
=  2.458).  With  respect  to  advertising,  the 
spillover parameter is also less than one (9  = 
595)  but is significantly higher than the equiv- 
alent  R&D  parameter,  perhaps  because  it  is 
easier to develop brand  awareness for a par- 
ticular type of fruit (Washington  apples) than 
it is to establish an entirely new variety. Given 
that  apple advertising is funded by  levies de- 
ducted from individual growers' sales receipts, 
this  level  of  free-riding  may  indeed  explain 
much of the recent grower dissatisfaction  with 
these  programs.'  Calculating  the  short-run 
elasticity  of  sales with  respect  to advertising 
clearly  illustrates  the  disincentive  effect  on 
others'  advertising created  by  a generic  pro- 
gran~.  as the elasticity is fully 58% lower than 
for the stock of advertising goodwill, or .I03 
(t-ratio - 2.494). This result  suggests that  if 
For u pointed description of both the most reccnt 
case involving  mushrooms in  Tennessee  and  perhaps 
the highest profile case of Wileman Bros. versus Glick- 
man,  see  the  NICPKE  quarterly  newsletter  (April 
2000). In  the latter, the Supreme Court  of  the  United 
States held  that  mandatory  assos~ments  were  indeed 
constitutional  and  do  not  violate  prc~wers' First 
Amendment rights. 
growers  were  able to effectively  brand  their 
product,  thereby  appropriating  more  of  the 
benefits from both  developing and promoting 
new varieties, then the overall effectiveness of 
commodity  organi~ations' programs  would 
likely  improve  both  directly  and  indirectly 
through a reduction  in the incentives to free- 
ride on others' participation. In addition to the 
differences in  appropriability and impact be- 
tween  advertising and  R&D, it  is also likely 
that they differ in terms of persistence as well. 
Detining  persistence  in  terms  of  the esti- 
niated  rate of goodwill depreciation, we esti- 
mate the value of 6, as .5  1  for advertising and 
.I 1  for R&D. Interpreting these parameters in 
terms  of  a  "partial  adjustment"  process, ad- 
vertising takes approximately 2 years to arrive 
at  its  desired  value  in  response  to  a  shock, 
whereas the impact of  a one-time investment 
in  R&D lasts for almost 10 years. This is con- 
sistent with our expectations as there exists a 
fundamental tradeoff between a high short-run 
advertising  impact  that  disappears  relatively 
quicl.tly and a small  short-run impact of  new 
product  investments  that  rises  only  after the 
product gains acceptance. This result  in  itself 
may also offer part of the explanation for why 
commodity organizations do not conduct more 
basic  variety  research.  Pressed  to  achieve 
short-run return-on-investment results by both 
growers and government regulators, these or- 
ganizations  are  likely  to  choose  a  myopic 
strategy and avoid investments, the payoff for 
which does not arrive until relatively far in the 
future. With the entire set of estimated param- 
eters, it is possible to determine, numerically. 
the  comparative  static derivatives  that  could 
not be determined analytically in  the theoret- 
ical model above. 
First,  we estimate  the  effect  of  changing 
the  stock  of  advertising  goodwill  on  invest- 
ment  demand for advertising and  R&D. Nu- 
merical  simulation  shows  that,  as  expected, 
higher levels  of advertising goodwill cause a 
greater  demand  for  annual  investments  in 
each.9ecause of  the positive complementar- 
Wetailed results for all  numerical si~ntrlations  are 
available from the authors. as space li~nitations  prevent 
including the rclevant  ligurcs here. ity between each activity, higher levels of one 
lead to higher marginal productivity and hence 
demand for the other. However, higher stocks 
of advertising goodwill  have more of an im- 
pact  on the demand for R&D than on adver- 
tising itself. Although many factors within the 
model potentially contribute to this result. the 
dominant inlluence is the t'ac~  that the diniin- 
ishing marginal returns to advertising limit the 
own-effect  on advertising demand, while the 
coniplementarity  with  R&D  stocks  accentu- 
ates the effect on research productivity. A sec- 
ond simulation shows that the effect of R&D 
on advertising is less pronounced than the op- 
posite case clue to the many sources of "leak- 
age"  of  R&D from  the  system-the  patent 
productivity  coefficient  is  less  than  one.  the 
spillover rate  is  higher,  and  a  more concave 
new  pl-oduct-demand  relationship.  Of  these 
factors. it is perhaps of greatest interest to con- 
sider the impact of appropriability on demand 
for either activity. 
To  this  end.  a  third  numerical  simulation 
shows the effect of a rising tj  parameter on the 
demand for both advertising and R&D invest- 
ments.  The  simulation  results  show  that  a 
higher  degree  of appropriabil ity  of  research 
benefits  letids  to greater  demand  for  current 
R&D services but  slightly  1owt.1-  demand for 
advertising. Although higher levels of 0 cause 
the rnarginal product of ~~ciditional  investments 
in  both  A  and B  to rise, the  increase in  pro- 
ductivity is greater for R than for A, even after 
allowing for the effect of diminishing margin- 
al  returns.  Additional  sirnulaticmi  show that 
this  effect  is  symmetric between  advertising 
and R&D as the denland for advertising rises 
with  ip,  but  the demand for  R&D is  left  vir- 
tually  ~~ncli~lnged.  This is  a  "partial"  effect, 
however, because  rising  values of A  as (F  in- 
creases will  cause the demand for h to rise, 
just  not  through  the  ip  mechanism.  Each  of 
these results suggests that it is perhaps the de- 
gree of  complementarity  that  determines the 
strength of the cross-activity effects. 
To examine this possibility, we simulate the 
impact  of  stronger  complementarity  (a,) on 
the demand for advertising and  R&D. As ex- 
pected.  greater comp1ernentn1-ity causes a 
higher demand for each. but  the effect is ap- 
proximately three times as strong in  R&D as 
in  advertising. Although  the  elasticity  of de- 
mand, with  respect  to new  products, the pro- 
ductivity of R&D, and the  appropriability of 
R&D output are all  relatively  low, the persis- 
tence of  R&D investment  is relatively  high. 
Thus,  although  advertising  promises  a  far 
greater  short-run  impact  on  sales,  product 
R&D can potentially have a significant role in 
increasing commodity demand, particulal-ly if 
advertising and R&D form parts of a coordi- 
nated  marketing strategy. 
Conclusions and I~nplications 
There are many  reasons why  fruit and  vege- 
table  commodity  organizations  conduct  or 
fund relatively little research and development 
activities or strive to patent their own varieties. 
Economic infeasibility, however,  is likely not 
one of them. Rather, these reasons may instead 
lie more in  legal. institutional, and budgetary 
issues.  This study  shows that  commodity or- 
ganizations  or  grower  cooperatives  may  be 
particularly effective in  developing successful 
new varieties primarily  because they  are able 
to promote the products that  they help create. 
Specitically,  this  study  finds  signiticant 
complernentarities  between commodity  re- 
search and promotion. Therefore, this suggests 
that  managers  of  co~n~nodity  organizations 
may be well advised to direct a significant part 
of  their checkoff  budget  to developing mar- 
ketable  new varieties. 'This.  in  turn, describes 
a model for commodity commissions that ad- 
mits a far broader set of responsibilities than 
is  now  the  case.  Rather than  simply  help to 
promote  the  commodities that  are grown  by 
its  members.  the commission  would  take  an 
active  role  in  detining,  developing, and  sus- 
taining  the  market  for  a  particular  variety. 
With  control  over  the  distribution  of  seed 
stock  from  its  R&D  efforts.  commissions 
woulcl  have a  measure of supply control that 
they don't  currently possess. 
However,  given  that  the  enforcement  of 
quality standards has raised allegations of car- 
tel-powel- ahuse in the past, these new respon- 
sibilities would require I-egulators to  define a 
new role for conimissions as activist agents of producer welfare.  Such a  role  may be  more 
palatable to society as a whole if  couched in 
terms of the new global agricultural economy, 
where other nations'  growers have been using 
similar practices for  Inany years. If commodity 
organizations take a more active role in fund- 
ing  and  licerlsing  their  own  varieties,  then 
growers themselves would clearly benefit from 
having a closer relationship to those doing tlie 
research and would have a  greater degree of 
certainty that the promotion they fund goes to 
promote  the  specific  commodity  that  they 
grow. In  this respect, future legal  challenges 
to generic promotion  programs will  be mute 
as organizations will have a direct, proprietary 
link to the "brand"  that they promote. 
These results, however, clear in the case of 
Washington apples, do apply directly only to 
this  particular  commodity.  The strength and 
generality  of  our conclusions  would  benefit 
from future research that is able to apply our 
methods to a  wider set of products involving 
deepel; more detailed data. 
[Received Lleceinh~r  2001; Acceptecl  Fehrii- 
ary 2002.1 
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Appendix A. Derivation of Reduced-Form 
Investment Demand Equations 
Pontryagin's  Maximum  Principle  (Kamicn  and 
Schwartz) applied  to the  Hami1toni:in  yields  lirst- 
order condition\. ilq, iJN, 
ON, iJB, 
iund  differentiating equations (22)  and (23)  with re- 
spect to time and substituting the resulting expres- 
sions  for q,  and  A,  along  with  equation  (3)  into 
ecluations  (2-l) and  (25). respectively,  eliminate 
both  A  and  q.  Then.  after  suppressing  time  sub- 
scripts, we  solvc  for  the  continuous  dynamic  de- 
mand functions for advertising and R&D shown in 
X  LI)(I  \ -  PY ,?(FA  -  IJLI  ,,{cpBI,  and 
(27)  17"  = (l)cl,N,O  - w,)  + (r  + 6,) 
where  r/, = ilc//;)A = a,, + 2a,A + u,N.  q, = iJy/ 
itN  = a?  + 2a:N + ([,A, N,,  = iJNIitR =  P,N, and 
the second del-iviitives follow straightforwardly. Al- 
though not  in reduced form, these structural  equa- 
tions define the basic rules for current expendit~~rc 
on advertising and K&D, conditional on changes in 
the  stock of  each over time. To arrive at recluced- 
form solutions for tz and h, it is necessary to elim- 
inate  A  and  B  between  the  structul-al  equations 
ahove and solve simultaneously for the control var- 
iahle values. In  addition to the necessary conditions 
presented  above.  the  maximum  principle  requires 
that the costate equations be satisfied such that 
Substitute these equations into equations (26) and 
(27)  and simplify  the resulting expressions by  de- 
lining 
V = pcpq, -  \I7,,  w  = py, 
Solving thew simultaneou\ly for the control vari- 
able values give\ 
{[(r  + 6,)  + S] 
X  L(r + 6,) + Yl(I - TX)} 
Simulating  these  solutions over  various  values of 
the  state and  costate variables produces  compara- 
tive static results  similar to those discussed above. 
However, these solutions provide long-term results 
wherein the state or costate variable is not assumed 
to be fixed. as  is  the case in  the  analysis above. 
These solutions also offer  an  investigation of  the 
effect of  greater complementarity  (a,) on  the  de- 
mand  fhr both  advel-tising  and R&D investments. 
These are interpreted  in  the text. 